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AN INFORMATION COMPANY IN MEXICO:
EXTENDING THE RESOURCE-BASED
VIEW OF THE FIRM
Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa
University of Texas at Austin
Dorothy E. Leidner
INSEAD
Abstract
This paper extends the resource-based view of the firm to a less developed country situation by
challenging  three boundary conditions associated  with the theory: first, the theory assumes
attractive local markets; second,  the theory applies to firms in relatively stable environments; third,
the theory assumes that the manager’s influence on creating sustained advantage is limited. The El
Norte case illustrates the ability of local managers to shape their external environment to pioneer
an information industry where no industry existed and to do so under highly turbulent conditions.
The findings bring forward the power of political connections, strategic foresight,  and flexibility
as key organizational competencies in  an emerging market.
Keywords: Competitive use of IS, international IS, case study, computing in developing countries,
resource-based view.
1. INTRODUCTION
In less developed countries, the environmental factors present much greater obstacles to IT adoption and diffusion
than in the developed countries (Montealegre 1994). However, little has been written about how a local firm
overcomes these environmental factors and creates competitive value from deploying information technology (IT).
This paper will explore how El Norte, a pioneering firm in an information industry in Mexico, was able to create an
apparent sustainable advantage over  large foreign competitors.  The El  Norte case will be interpreted through the
lens of the resource-based theory of the firm.   The article is organized as follows:  section 2 reviews literature on
the resource-based view of the firm,  section 3 presents the methodology used, section 4 presents the case and its
analysis, section 5 discusses the theoretical implications of the results, and section 6 concludes the article.
2. THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM
The resource-based view of the firm sees a firm as a bundle of resources that are either tangible (e.g., financial assets,
technology) or intangible (e.g., managerial skills, reputation) (Barney 1991, 1997).  Resources are heterogeneous
across firms and some resources are valuable, yet rare, difficult to imitate, or nonsubstitutable by allowing those
firms who have them to have core capabilities  that distinguish them from others. Resources that  provide sustainable
advantage tend to be (1) causally ambiguous (e.g., transformational leadership),  (2) socially complex  ( e.g., culture),
or  (3) rare (firm specific) (Barney 1997).  In  information systems, the resource-based view of the firm has been used
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to explain how firms can create competitive value from information technology assets (Ross et al. 1996) and how
sustainability resides more in the organization’s managerial skills to leverage IT than in the technology itself  (Mata
et al. 1995).
The extensive literature on the theory suggests three boundary conditions.  The first is that a firm has access to
attractive markets (Collis and Montgomery 1995; Levinthal and Myatt 1994; Porter 1990).   Second, the firm operates
in a relatively stable environment  and third the manager’s influence on creating sustained advantage is limited
(Barney 1997).  The El Norte case provides an opportunity to extend the resource-based view of the firm to a less
developed country by challenging the three boundary conditions.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
The case study method was chosen because the interest in this research was in  broad issues of “how” the firm had
used IT and “why” it had succeeded in doing so despite a seemingly poor fit with the local environment for launching
an information, and particularly a real-time information, business.   No hypotheses nor theories were developed
before data collection; rather, it was desired that the data analysis drive the theoretical lens used for interpretation
rather than vice versa (Galunic and Eisenhardt 1996).
3.1 Data Collection
Data collection took place in the spring and summer of 1995, and then again in the spring of 1997. The majority of
the data was collected through semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions focused on what, how, and why
innovations had taken place.  Interviews were conducted with 12 El Norte employees in Monterrey and 20 employees
in Mexico City, five academics with collaboration/consulting relationships with El Norte, and three former residents/
business people of Mexico City who had been customers of El Norte’s products.  Within El Norte, the interviewees
represented a mix of levels and functions: these included business unit heads, the research and developoment (R&D)
manager, the head of advertising, editors, reporters, a production manager, a circulation manager, an information
technology manager, delivery staff, and several members of the clerical staff.
Two-thirds of the interviews were conducted in English, the rest in Spanish via a translator. Many of the interviews
(mostly with the senior management)  were scheduled in advance.  These interviews  lasted from one to three hours
and were tape recorded and transcribed. The interviews started with broad questions on the Mexican business
environment, industry, competitors, the interviewees’ personal history and experience at El Norte, and their roles in
the key innovations at El Norte since the mid-1980s. The specific questions varied by the person’s current position
as well as their past roles.
 
In addition, other interviews (for example, the ones with reporters, production staff, delivery staff, and clerical staff)
were conducted as informal discussions on an ad-hoc basis as the researchers toured various facilities.   Additional
data was gathered from annual reports, newsletters, marketing and other promotion information on products and
services, senior management speeches, strategy plans, mission statements, trade journals, local newspapers, the
Internet, newswires, and electronic mail messages.
3.2 Data Analysis
The analysis of the data was conducted in several steps.  First, the transcripts were read through while listening to
the tapes to verify their accuracy.  Then,  notes were taken that enabled a broad picture of the organization’s
background, of the organization’s key products, and of the organization’s major decisions over the past several years.
Notes were taken on themes that arose during the interviews and as other interviewees made supporting comments,
these were added under a general theme. From these themes, the initial case analysis was written. Finally, transcripts
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were analyzed for specific factors that supported, refuted, or extended the resource-based theory of the firm. In
particular, the research looked for comments pertaining to the firm’s history, social complexity, causal ambiguity,
or information technology that were perceived as enabling sustainable advantages.  In addition, the research looked
for other factors that were not captured in these four factors that are thought to enable sustainable competitive
advantage.
In summary, the research method used could be broadly classified under an interpretive epistemology (Barrett and
Walsham 1995; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Walsham 1993) using a single case study.  The case description is
provided next.
4. THE EL NORTE CASE STUDY
4.1 The Case Description
Headquartered in Monterrey, Neuve Leon, El Norte currently has three main outlets:  El Norte,1 the number one
newspaper in Monterrey, Reforma, the number two newspaper in Mexico City and the only global Mexican
newspaper, and Infosel, a Monterrey-based provider of on-line, real-time information for businesses.   The managers
in El Norte consider the company to be “an information company with different channels to distribute the informa-
tion.”
El Norte first began publishing a Monterrey newspaper, El Norte News, in 1922.  By 1993, El Norte News held
between 90% and 95% of the newspaper market in Monterrey, a city of roughly five million inhabitants, and
considerable power to shape city politics. As the economy began to shows signs of change in the early 1980s, El
Norte’s senior managers began planning for the future.
In 1985, CEO Alejandro Junco made a decision to redefine the company—to become an information company rather
than a newspaper company. He concurrently decided that technology would be the most important competitive
weapon, coining the motto: “Information technology provides the way for market advantage.”  As early as 1981 when
the IBM PC appeared on the market, Junco started thinking about the PC as a potential media to deliver information.
In 1985-1986, Junco established Infosel (Informacion Selectivo—selective information) as the company within El
Norte that would handle the electronic information aspect and would work very closely with the IT department in
developing information. The first project was to make a large electronic database of everything that was being
published on  paper around the world about Mexico.  This database also included government-based statistical
information on the economy.  The electronic archive project was started on January 1, 1986.  By April of 1987,
Infosel launched its first on-line service, Infosel Onlinea, consisting of on-line access to the archived information
and to the El Norte News.  The service allowed subscribers to dial into Infosel’s system and perform searches of the
information.
Soon after, Junco began pushing for a real-time financial information product in part as a reaction to the financially
paralyzing stock market crash of 1987.  The top managers at El Norte believed that one of the reasons for the crash
in Mexico was simply a lack of information:  “It was a market operating without information,” said the head of
Infosel business unit.  Individuals were blind investors and foreign investment was both risky and limited. Several
US firms already had entered the electronic financial information market, including Reuter’s, Dow Jones, Knight-
Ridder, and Telerate, but the market in Mexico for real-time financial and market information had been heretofore
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very weak.  Infosel thus began working to get stock information from the Mexican Bolsa (the stock exchange).
Getting the Mexican Bolsa to agree to provide them stock information entailed what one manager describes as a three
year battle.  Finally, in November 1990, after having successfully persuaded the Bolsa to provide them access to
information, Infosel launched Infosel Financiero even as it canceled the Infosel Onlinea project. Although the need
for on-line access to information was burgeoning, technical problems had vitiated the Infosel Onlinea product.
Inadequate telephone lines in Mexico introduced so much static and noise that customers quickly became frustrated
and the project eventually failed.
By contrast, Infosel Financiero was created as an on-line financial information service that did not rely on telephone
lines.  Instead, El Norte invested in satellite dishes and FM broadcast stations throughout Mexico. Prior to El Norte’s
Infosel Financiero project, companies could only subscribe to satellite services via a government agency that would
provide a connection. El Norte successfully convinced the government to allow them to have their own satellite dish
and El Norte was able to provide access to its Infosel Financiero product via the satellite dish and FM stations in each
city in Mexico.
Unlike Infosel Onlinea, Infosel Financiero experienced success and growth almost from the day of its inception.  By
1993, Infosel was earning $8 million in revenue from Financiero which grew to $10 million in 1994 and $12 million
in 1995.  In 1993, Infosel launched a network product that would allow subscribing organizations to have one
subscription but many users.   In 1995, Infosel developed a financial wide area network and a billing system-—so
that subscribers could not only receive financial information, but could immediately make and implement buying
and selling decisions and take actions on-line.
As of today, the Infosel Financiero product contains information from NYSE, NASDAQ, the options and equities
markets, the fixed income, commodities, and futures markets.  Infosel also develops information for CD-ROM
applications such as legal information, accounting information, and library information.  The current growth is
coming from these market niches.   Infosel has a presence not only in Monterrey, Mexico City, and Guadalajara (the
largest three cities in Mexico), but also in San Luis, Montilla, and many places throughout the country, as well as
around the world.
Even as Junco’s vision of the electronic distribution of real-time information was flourishing, he made the decision
in 1993 to launch a new newspaper in the already flooded Mexico City market. Mexico City, a city of 25 million and
the second largest city in the world, had a plethora of existing papers and many people suggested that Junco was
“crazy” to enter into the Mexico City market.  But Junco’s vision was about change:  changing the nature of
information delivered so that the information was trustworthy and so that the presentation of the information was
superior.  El Norte invested heavily in technology to enable Reforma to be the most colorful and graphical newspaper
in Mexico, to enable Reforma to maintain the image created by El Norte News of objective information, and to enable
Reforma to invest in human resources and training.
On November 20, 1993, El Norte produced the first Reforma newspaper.  By 1995, Reforma had a daily circulation
of 86,000 newspapers and 39,000 subscribers.   Also in 1995, in conjunction with Infosel, Reforma opened a web
site to distribute news from its Reforma newspaper on the Internet and received 16,000 inquiries the first day.  
Reforma currently has the largest market share in the upper segments of Mexico City, which are the most important
for advertisers. Reforma engages in regular customer surveys, encourages letters from readers, and has editorial
boards comprised of individuals from the community.
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Table 1.  Environmental Challenges and Example Responses by El Norte
Environmental Challenges Solutions
Cultural Constraints
• Work ethic and values among Mexican journalists • Hire fledglings and create a strong culture
• Lack of trust in information • Pay reporters a good salary and eliminate bribery
• Separate functions of writing stories and selling ads
• Absence of market need for objective, real-time in-
formation
• Refocus product on a leading industry segment (fi-
nancial services industry)
Political Constraints 
• Government’s control of key resources and distribu-
tion channels
• Develop private delivery infrastructure
• Exploit powerful position of the CEO in city-poli-
tics
Technical Constraints
• Weak national IT infrastructure • Redesign product around less modern media
• Technology use lagging among customers • Free seminars to customers
4.2 Environmental Challenges and El Norte’s Solutions
El Norte’s rise to the summit of the information business in Mexico has not been without challenges.  Interviews with
managers in El Norte revealed several key constraints imposed upon them by their environment that had to be
carefully managed (Table 1).
4.2.1  Overcoming Cultural Constraints
Among the cultural constraints were (1) a work ethic among journalists that was inconsistent with El Norte’s
aspirations to nonbiased information and (2) a lack of market for on-line information.
One major cultural challenge entailed recruiting journalists with profoundly different work attitudes than the typical
journalist in Mexico at that time.  It had become common practice in Mexico City for journalists to partake of “the
on-going system of selling favors and expecting something in return.”  In order to maintain this high standard in the
face of growth and the move to a new market (i.e., Mexico City), El Norte decided that it was not possible to “erase
that culture” so they decided to take “fresh, new people  that had never been journalists and train them so they could
work within our own ethics code and our own standards.”  El Norte went to universities to recruit, a practice very
rare in Mexico, and solicited applications.  They received 2,800 applications for the first 100 positions.  The 100
graduates were sent to a six week training program where they were to learn about company culture and ethics,
writing styles, aggressiveness, and techniques.   The typical employee of El Norte is described as young (in
comparison to equivalent employees in other newspaper companies), health-conscious (few smoke and many exercise
regularly), and hard-working.  The starting salaries are higher than the industry average and outstanding individual
performance is rewarded with sharp pay raises. By carefully selecting graduates and training them, El Norte was able
to create a culture that encouraged innovation, inculcated hard-work, and pushed technological limits.
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A second cultural roadblock was the seeming absence of a perceived market need for real-time financial and market
information.  The Mexican culture was not ready to use on-line information and was certainly not ready to pay for
it.  One manager referred to Mexico as “an information poor country.”  Here the challenge was to teach the potential
users about the benefits of this kind of information and why it was worth paying for. The general attitude was that
one paid a peso or two for a newspaper—why would anyone pay $500 for an information product. The concept of
“real time” was not easy to understand nor was the concept that information is an important tool for decision making.
One manager stated that “even more difficult than the technology was the culture.”  To respond to this problem,
Infosel learned from the Onlinea product that a general product was ahead of its time and refocused instead on the
financial industry with its Financiero product.  The financial industry was the easiest to penetrate since these markets
were becoming global and to survive, firms needed trustworthy, real time information.
4.2.2 Overcoming Technical Constraints
El Norte faced two technical roadblocks:  (1) a weak national technology infrastructure prevented effective rollout
of information products and (2) customer technology lagged behind that of El Norte. The initial Infosel on-line
product was canceled because the telephone infrastructure could not support point-to-point operations. The second
product used a broadcast wireless transmission wherein information was sent to FM radio stations and distributed
via local stations.  The second major technical constraint was that as Infosel continued to innovate and expand, they
constantly found themselves ahead of their customers technologically.  When they first introduced CD-ROM
products for legal information, their clients did not have the CD-ROM drives.  When they first introduced material
on the Internet, clients had not yet heard of the world wide web.  Infosel provided free seminars to educate its clients.
4.2.3 Overcoming Political Constraints
All single copy newspaper stands in Mexico City were unionized. The union (Union de Voceadores) was affiliated
with the ruling party—the PRI.  These unions resented the fact that Reforma would be printed and sold every day
of the year except for Christmas and New Year’s (all the other newspapers did not print on official holidays, of which
there are many in Mexico). Moreover, because Reforma was defined as an independent newspaper, conservative PRI
members were opposed to criticism coming from outside their traditional means of  control and used the unions as
a means to attempt to suppress sales of Reforma.  In response to Reforma’s pressure to sell even on holidays, sellers
withdrew Reforma posters and tried to stop distribution of Reforma altogether. After attempting to negotiate with
the unions, El Norte decided that it would be more efficacious to bypass the unions.  El Norte thus made the decision
to create its own distribution channel.  This was a very costly decision but worked in  the favor of El Norte.  Many
within El Norte attribute the rapid growth in sales to the private distribution system. This was another attempt by El
Norte to shape its environment.
The government also contributed to the infrastructure problems in two ways:  (1) government resistance to allow
access to market information and (2) government resistance to allow private firms access to advanced technologies.
One of the first delays encountered by El Norte as it pushed forward with Infosel was that the Mexican Bolsa did not
want to yield information and regarded El Norte as a competitor.  The negotiations took three years to complete.  In
the interim, Infosel established what they referred to as the real-time newsgroup.  This group collated daily informa-
tion on markets as well as relevant stories for business readers.  This group would therefore gather the information
that the Bolsa refused to deliver.  Perhaps in part because the Bolsa realized that the information would be obtained
even if they did not cede, an agreement was reached.  El Norte encountered a similar problem when it tried to create
a wide-area network based on satellite technology.  The government wanted to maintain control over satellite access
but eventually Infosel prevailed and was granted the first state license to own and operate a satellite.
In summary, El Norte has experienced high growth and innovativeness in a market that did not always initially value
the products El Norte had to offer.  The El Norte case is next interpreted from the resource-based view of the firm.
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5. CASE ANALYSIS:  THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW
In 1986, over ten years ago, El Norte did not face an attractive industry that would have provided resources to
develop its core capabilities. Also, the firm made a large wager that the local markets would be deregulated and that
the local firms would require new information services. Yet, via use of its key resources—Junco’s leadership, its
history of political independence, corporate culture, IT investments, community networks, and its geographical base
—El Norte developed core competencies that position it as an undisputed local leader in the information provider
sector. These capabilities are political connectedness, managerial foresight of market trends, strategic flexibility, new
IT-based information products and ideas, and the reputation for trustworthiness. Through shaping the environment,
El Norte has created a unique configuration of resources  that in combination are rare, valuable, and difficult to
imitate by large international players. Table 2 summarizes the analysis of El Norte via the resource-based view.
5.1 The Key Resources
In shaping the environment, El Norte developed and utilized key resources which in turn became the source of core
competencies.
5.1.1 Leadership and Political Connectedness of Junco
The powerful leadership and political connections of Junco has probably been the single most important resource
of El Norte’s success. Only an insider in Mexico could have acquired (even after three years of negotiation) a satellite
for private ownership from the government or could have come up with an agreement (again even after long
negotiations) with the Mexican Bolsa to supply information.  Such an accomplishment would not have been possible
for someone less well connected, certainly not a foreigner.  In addition, the political connectedness of Junco enabled
him to see emerging political and economic events as well as the resultant new markets and new needs in his own
country, which triggered the innovations allowing El Norte to pioneer a local information industry in Mexico.
Table 2.  Analysis of El Norte via Resource-Based View
Key Resources Core Capabilities
Causally ambiguous
• Leadership • Political Connections/ Managerial Foresight
• Tradition of political independence • Trustworthiness/Integrity
Socially complex
• Firm culture • Strategic Integration/Flexibility
• Strong community networks • Strategic Flexibility
Rare (firm specific)
• Investments and experimentation with
new technology
• Geography/demography
• New information products and services
• Progressive IT infrastructure
• Professionalism
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5.1.2 History of Political Independence
The firm’s tradition of fact-based journalism and political independence has contributed to the core capability of
trustworthiness and integrity. As a recently graduated journalism student, Junco took over the company in 1973 at
the age of 25 from his grandfather and did not hesitate to  go head to head against the Mexican president of the time,
Lois Echeverria, calling him a corrupt demagogue.  El Norte’s newsprint allotment was reduced by more than 80%
but the spirited Junco refused to ebb his criticism (Palmeri 1995). At that time, the key resource—paper—was  totally
controlled by the government.
Since then, El Norte has had numerous fights with the government, with private companies, and with academia about
the editorial line. The editorial line has continued to present the facts regardless of who stood to gain or lose from
the facts.  This political independence has been a tremendous competitive asset to the firm as it has positioned itself
as the first provider of trustworthy, reliable, and uncompromised news.
5.1.3 Culture
El Norte has succeeded in American style businesses, but beat Americans by being Mexican. Its culture is modern,
yet deeply embedded in Mexican traditions and patriotism.  Its employees were on a mission to disseminate
information about Mexico to Mexicans in order to enable them to compete against large multinational companies.
Harnessing this strong Mexican culture has been a  key resource enabling a unique advantage to El Norte.  It has
presented the firm with shortcuts or advantages while raising barriers  of foreignness2 for non-Mexican firms wishing
to enter the Mexican market. El Norte has selectively adopted and successfully modified ideas from industrialized
nations to mold them to the local culture.
5.1.4 Strong Community Networks
Strong community networks promote competencies of foresight and strategic flexibility. Networks exist with
customers as well as with the government. Wishing to have a paper for the people, El Norte News established
“editorial boards” composed of individuals from the community who serve free of charge for nine to ten months at
a time. These boards provide important feedback to the editors of the respective newspaper concerning what types
of topics need to be addressed, issues that need to be surfaced, and special reports that would be valuable. El Norte
has over  200 alumni of their editorial boards who serve as sources of information within their respective industries.
This human network, which transcends the organization’s boundaries, contributes to a sustainable advantage over
larger, multinational firms.
In terms of Infosel, developing a human network with government and the financial sector was viewed as critical as
well.  The management of Infosel maintains that they have close communication ties with government and bank
officers who are typically the first to be aware of important news in the financial sector and this network has given
Infosel an advantage over Reuters and other US-based firms trying to tap the Mexican market.   In addition, these
tight liaisons with individuals in industry and government enabled Infosel to withstand takeover attempts by US
firms.  Infosel was forcefully accosted by a US firm wishing to purchase Infosel and Infosel wanted to maintain its
independence and form a partnership. Subsequently,  the US firm offered Infosel customers a 30% discount to switch.
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Such tactics, while effective in cultures where loyalty takes second place to economics, are ineffective in a culture
that values the human tie.
5.1.5 Geography/Demography
Geographically speaking, El Norte is headquartered in Monterrey.  Alhough far from the sea and any port, although
not favored by climate and distant from markets and all sources of raw materials, Monterrey is known as having the
most advanced industry in Mexico (DeRossi 1971).  The people from Monterrey are characterized as industrious,
driven, and independent (DeRossi 1971; Kras 1995).  These demographic factors have promoted professionalism
as a core competency within El Norte.
5.1.6 IT Investments
The firm believes fundamentally in the power of technology to provide a competitive advantage. The technology
officer reports directly to Junco. In the early 1980s, El Norte was among the first Mexican firms to set up a formal
IT department. Technical experimentation and innovation are firmly embedded in El Norte’s culture. IT is also at
the heart of its product strategy. The firm offers different product lines by different technology options: Internet, CD-
ROM, online services, etc. IT also provides operational and structural flexibility in the firm’s internal operations
(e.g., virtual newsroom). Yet, El Norte understands the need to take a long term view of technology investments. For
example, the problem with their original on-line service was an example of how they had to learn from their setbacks
and redesign some of their ways of doing business.
Perseverance in developing a private IT infrastructure to combat the underdeveloped national infrastructure also
proved to have important strategic consequences for Infosel.  As the US market grew in importance to Mexican
investors, a new demand for information about the US surged.  One manager in Infosel states that, prior to 1990, there
was no information made available on US markets because there simply was no demand for such information.
However, with the burgeoning of NAFTA, demand for US market information grew and several of the well-
established US information companies including Knight-Ridder, Telerate, and Reuters began pursuing the Mexican
market.  The long fought battle to establish Infosel’s infrastructure turned into a competitive advantage as the US
firms, to operate efficiently in Mexico, required a large shift from their normal infrastructure.  Infosel was in an
enviable position of having already developed a low-cost option which allowed them to be more expansive.
In summary, the leadership and political connections of El Norte’s CEO have enabled the firm to distinguish itself
by its foresight of the coming trends. Its tradition of fact-based journalism and political independence has enabled
the firm’s new online products and services to leverage the core capability  of trustworthy information. The firm’s
human resource policies as well as the Monterrey roots promote professionalism. The firm’s culture that centered
on the deep pride in the country,  strong human networks, and its investments in IT provide strategic flexibility in
a turbulent and rapidly evolving market place.
6. DISCUSSION 
The fundamental difference between managing in a less developed and a developed country is that in the less
developed country, the environment is more challenging and carries more significant managerial implications (Austin
1990).  The purpose of this study was to uncover how a local information firm in a less developed country context
can mold its environment and create sustainable advantage over foreign competitors. Although past research has
assumed that  under environmental jolts, a firm’s core capabilities become obsolete and might even become “core
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rigidities” (Leonard-Barton 1992; Tushman and Anderson 1986), this study found instead that the firm’s capabilities
and key resources might be strengthened as long as the executives have foresight to shape their external environment
during the time of turbulence.
The past work on the resource-based view has had an overly internal focus (Miller and Shamsie 1996). Among the
exceptions are Hart (1995), who examined the role of natural environmental constraints on a  firm’s core capability
development, and Miller and Shamsie, who examined the value of resources under stable and unstable  environments.
The present study provides a perspective of a firm located in a  less developed country.
Thomas (1996) suggests that many competitive models, including the five-forces model, are Anglo-Saxon to the
extent that they ignore the broader environment including the government, capital markets, and the institutions of
science.   These environmental factors are expected to play significant roles, both as constraints and as drivers, in
less developed countries.  El Norte found that the government posed certain constraints, even viewing El  Norte as
a competitor at times.  However, the relationships that El Norte built with government officials also proved over the
long-term to be advantageous.  They were able to get a lead on important information that foreign-based firms would
have no access to and were able to eventually negotiate important deals that foreigners would have been precluded
from even considering.  Similarly, while the Mexican culture itself posed constraints on El Norte’s ability to achieve
its desired goals, the culture also provided El Norte with an asset internally (in terms of motivating employees that
their work was tied to the success of Mexico) and externally (in terms of forming strong ties with the community).
And while the technical infrastructure of Mexico posed an initial constraint on El Norte, this weak infrastructure also
provided El Norte with an advantage over foreign firms as El Norte was able to readjust their project to the country’s
capabilities and later negotiate concessions from the government.  Thus, the environment has profound effect on the
operations of a local firm in a less developed country, but there is also a paradox: the constraints and vulnerabilities
of their environment  can be turned to their  chief assets (Nee 1992).
Hence, in the less developed country context, responding to the environmental constraints as well as influencing them
in a proactive manner is a key to success. Strategic flexibility plays a central role. Flexibility means that not only will
a firm be able to respond to the environmental changes, but it has a capacity and management repertoire to influence
or even  control those environmental  changes as well (i.e., control capacity of the management) (Volberda 1996).
Miller and Shamsie distinguished between knowledge and other resources. They argue that resources that can be used
to respond to a larger number of contingencies (so called knowledge-based assets) help firm performance during
unstable and unpredictable environments, whereas non-knowledge-based assets  help performance during stable and
predictable environments.
In a less developed country, a firm facing newly open markets is  likely to find itself at a disadvantage in terms of
knowledge resources to devote to strategic readjustment.  A key issue for these firms is how to effect flexibility in
the short-term while maintaining a long-term vision. El Norte created such flexibility by  establishing strong
community networks, establishing a strong internal IT infrastructure, embedding strong national pride into the
organizational culture, and working within the political system where possible but developing alternative strategies
on an interim basis.
The study has a number limitations that need to be considered in making any conclusions. First, the single case site
limits the generalizability of results. The purpose of the study was not to provide generalizability of empirical results
to other firms, rather the purpose was to “expand and generalize theories” (Yin 1984). Second, the primary data was
based on interviews that provided retrospective accounts of events. Although retrospective data is inferior to
longitudinal concurrent data, recent research suggests that retrospective reports, particularly if provided first-hand,
can be reliable and valid (Miller et al. 1997). Third, the researchers analyzed the case data via a theoretical lens
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developed in the US.  The emphasis was not on understanding the events using Mexico’s own  management thinking,
terms, and constructs. This approach is justified as long as one believes that there may be universal management
principles (Early and Singh 1995).
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